Fourteen years after the February 1979 insurrection, not only has the regime in power in Iran not solved any of the social problems, but has made them even worse and is itself in a deep internal political crisis. The runaway inflation - officially at 60 per cent - has meant that the cost of basic foodstuffs, just in the past year, increased a few fold. The earnings of toilers' families have been halved since the 1979 insurrection and the issues of unemployment and housing have become frightfully acute. The budget deficit stands at $10 billion per annum, there are severe problems with the money supply, and the letters of credit are settled after long delays. All these problems point to the regime's weakness and deep crisis.
In the face of such realities, the Iranian toilers - in the wake of the strikes of the oil workers, especially since last summer - have staged widespread anti-government riots. The recent uprisings in Mashhad, Shiraz, Arak and Shooshter have sabotaged the Rafsanjani faction's policies and plans. The "successful" election of the Rafsanjani faction and its majority in the Majles (parliament), were supposed to strengthen the "moderates" and ease the process of the return to a modern capitalist system and close links with imperialism. The anti-government protests of the toilers, however, have worried a section of the ruling clique about the future of the regime and forced them to seek the support of, and even unity with, the "hardline" faction. The mollahs will accept a modern capitalist system only on the condition that it does not endanger their position. They prefer to sacrifice the long-term interests of capitalism for their short-term gains. At the same time, they know that the slightest opening and movement of the masses will expose their repressive apparatus to danger and destruction.
Immediately after the riots, a group of Qom clerics, headed by Ayatollah Javadi-Amoli - an influential member of the executive branch - met Khameneii in Tehran and came to some agreements with him. Khameneii now has the opportunity and has shown his inclination to exercise influence as the "leader of the Islamic Republic."
After these behind the scene machinations, the "civil war" of the regime's factions began in earnest - especially as the Presidential election is scheduled for next March, and by then the fate of Rafsanjani's policies must be settled. At first, the leader of the Qom Hezbollahis , Bagher Khar razi , talked of a "creeping coup" against Khameneii and the "destruction of the Islamic Republic" (!) by some people. Then in sermons and the pre-agenda discussions of the Majles the in-fighting intensified. Finally, Ali Akbar Nategh-Nouri, the Speaker of the Majles , in an interview with Keyhan daily spoke of "two groups". "The first group believes in the continuation of the revolution and the upholding of Islamic values" (the supporters of Khameneii) and the second group is made up of "technocrats and liberals" who are prepared to sacrifice Islamic values for the sake of economic development (the supporters of Rafsanjani). The underpinning of the legal position of the " baseeji " (mobilisation forces) was also raised in the Majles in connection with this issue. The "security forces of the Islamic Republic" (the Islamic Committees, the gendarmerie, and the police), were unable to control the disturbances and the ruling elite had to fall back on the " hezbollah " yet again. According to a new law passed by the Majles, the " baseeji " are now allowed to arrest anyone in the street and have more power than the "security forces". The "hardliners" wanted the " baseeji " to have even more power, whereas the Rafsanjani faction is against this new law.
Rafsanjani's response to these developments has been to attack Khameneii. In his sermon on November 6, he said that the election of a "leader'' can be completed in "one round and through the direct vote of the people," and if the " Vali-e-Faghih " acts in a maverick fashion, then he is "automatically discharged." These words were in response to Azari-Qomi and Ahmad Janati, who see the " Vali-e-Faghih " as being above the law and view the "unquestioned" obedience of the " Faghih " as "essential". To protect his own position, Rafsanjani has become a "democrat" and talks of the "rule of the people by the people" against the "absolutist Velayat-e-Faghih " and "absolute despotism"!
The recent differences between the different factions of the ruling clique have at least highlighted two points. Firstly, because of the regime's internal contradictions due to its unique character, it is not capable of returning Iran to a purely modern capitalist system. Such clashes will continue until the total victory of one faction over the other - but at the same time the process of normalisation of relations with the West continues at a slower pace. Secondly, there is not an ounce of progressive content in the policies of either faction - despite the continuing demagogy. Both factions are part of a backward-looking system and will not change under any conditions (the way the factions united against the recent riots of toiling people has shown the true character of their differences). The outcome of the Presidential election - i.e., whether it is Rafsanjani or Khameneii who is re-elected - will make a qualitative difference to the political crisis of the regime.
The ruling clique's continuing political crisis, however, must not be taken to mean that this regime will collapse as a result of its internal contradictions, or just by a revolt of the toilers. Whatever the internal differences may be, these will merely weaken the regime and not cause its downfall, and eventually one faction will triumph. At the same time, the strongest of spontaneous uprisings of toilers will only shake the foundations of the regime, but will not seal its fate. Against such a regime (or any other capitalist regime), workers' and toilers' political organisations (councils and a revolutionary organisation) must be formed and the overthrow of the regime be organised through them. Without political organisation, planning, the expansion of the practical activities of the workers based on the lessons of past struggles, final victory will not be achieved.
Independent workers' organisations are formed in the period of revolutionary upsurge by the proletarian vanguard and we must prepare ourselves for the formation of such organisations now. To build a revolutionary organisation, however, first its initial cells must be formed around a revolutionary programme, and clear tasks and principles (the revolutionary party will not take shape spontaneously). Therefore one of the main tasks of the revolutionary vanguard - in the absence of a broad-based workers' revolutionary organisation - is the forming of the initial cells of a revolutionary organisation around a revolutionary programme and with a democratic organisational structure. Without preparation for the formation of a revolutionary party for the overthrow of the regime, the present political crisis of the ruling clique will eventually be solved in favour of one of the regime's factions.
M. Razi
18 December 1992 (Translation of the Editorial of WSN No 13).
Qom is the main "holy" city in Iran.Ayatollah Ali Hossein Khameneii was President for almost ten years and has been in the Rafsanjani faction during the last few years, when Rafsanjani turned him into a puppet and used him merely as an archetypal wise old man.
Vali-e-Faghih : religious jurist with supreme authority.
Velayat-e-Faghih : rule of the Faghih , i.e., the subordination of political power to Islamic precepts, criteria and objectives in the legislative, executive and judicial organs.