The Uprising of the Urban Poor and the Policies of the Iranian Regime
In the wake of the oil workers' strike and the following demonstrations and riots in Chahar Mahal Bakhtiari and Khorramabad, the cities of Shiraz and Mashad witnessed major uprisings in late May. The recent rebellions clearly reflect a new and tangibly different phase in the struggles of the Iranian working class.
The unique feature of the Mashad riot was the intensity of the mass protest against the institutions and organs of the capitalist regime. Two youths were killed when the residents of the 'out of boundary' shanty town of Kooye Tollab, near Mashad, stood up against the regime's bulldozers, and an army support unit, sent to destroy their homes. The slum-dwellers took up the two bodies and carried them in a demonstration towards Tabrassi Boulevard and gradually thousands joined the demonstration and the streets came under the control of the demonstrators. Major government offices such as the offices of the Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance, the Tax Office, banks and police stations were occupied and burnt down by the people. Mullahs were seen fleeing the area and the security forces were only capable of regaining control of the town well after midnight.
The next day, the wave of arrests and executions started. Four people charged with 'inciting riots' were executed immediately. Thousands were arrested. After a few days of silence, the government controlled press was forced to admit that riots had taken place. Initially, the leaders of the regime tried to blame the incident on a 'handful of criminals and ruffians'. After a few weeks, however, when news of this and riots in other cities spread throughout the world, the government had to admit that the 'criminals had duped large sections of the population into following them'. During Friday prayers on 2nd of June, Rafsanjani called on government officials to deal with the most urgent demands of the people, 'so that the criminals can't find any excuses'.
Following the recent upheavals, the ruling faction, the Rafsanjani-Khameneii clique, has been forced to change some aspects of its internal policy. In July, Ali Khameneii, speaking to militia leaders, called on the 'Hezbollah' to intervene in politics. The resignation of Khatemi, the 'moderate' Minister of Culture and Islamic Guidance, was accepted by Rafsanjani and a supporter of the 'radical faction' put in his place. From late July the Islamic militia has started a major widespread attack on 'badly veiled women' in the streets of Tehran.
Following widespread corruption and bribery amongst the pasdars, the government recently replaced them with Islamic militia mainly recruited from the provinces. These 'mobilisation forces of resistance' have been let loose on the people, especially women.
The recent events in Iran highlight a few points:
Firstly, the economic crisis facing the regime is so severe that even if the Rafsanjani clique gains full control, the initial stages of economic reconstruction will take many years.
On the one hand, war damage, runaway inflation, unemployment, and on the other, the speed with which the regime has turned towards imperialism's policies (demanding huge loans from the IMF, an open door policy towards foreign investment), together with mismanagement, internal conflict and chaos has put the government in a position where it cannot respond to the specific problems facing Iranian society.
The main aim of the Rafsanjani clique is a return to 'the Shah's golden era'. Achieving this aim, however, might prove more difficult. Gaining a majority in the Majles, and making a few deals with George Bush, will not help to solve Iran's severe economic crisis overnight. As long as periodic crises paralyse imperialist countries, an Iran under the rule of a capitalist regime will suffer long term economic recession.
The economic crisis has also left its trace on agriculture: food and agricultural imports have increased by $6 billion over the last year. The migration of the peasants to the cities has risen and the population is growing at a frightening rate. The number of the urban poor living in shanty towns is increasing daily and their day-to-day problems remain unresolved - housing, unemployment, lack of food and so on. The majority of the population in Iran have become increasingly poorer, while a small are getting richer. The recent uprisings of the urban poor are refections of this situation. The Iranian people have had enough and blame the capitalist regime for society's problems. The events that led to the recent riots were merely opportunities for expressing dissatisfaction with the capitalist regime, and this is no more than the beginning of mass struggles.
Secondly, the 'moderate' faction, contrary to the beliefs of some opposition forces (the social democrats of the Fedayeen Majority and the Tudeh Party, the royalists and the 'republicans' who hoped to come to some agreement with the Rafsanjani regime), is not very different from the so-called 'radical' faction. The two factions of the regime are far more worried about the people's struggles than their internal differences. In the face of popular opposition the 'moderate' faction became 'hardline' overnight and called on the Hezbollah to suppress the 'criminals and undesirable elements', who had caused trouble, and temporarily forgot its 'liberal' allies. The 'hardliners' can also become moderate for a short time. However, the two factions of the regime are united in their determination to suppress the people and to defend the interests of capitalists. Their only difference lies in the preferred 'style' of organising a capitalist economy: one faction favours a revival of modern capitalism, similar to that of the Shah, the other faction favours a clerical (semi-feudal) type.
The present manoeuvres of the Rafsanjani faction, however, should not be seen as a true conversion to the 'hardline' faction. There is no policy reversal; the royalists, the supporters of the Tudeh Party and the Fedayeen Majority can rest assured! The recent 'radicalism' of the Rafsanjani-Khameneii faction is a temporary measure, necessary because of the gravity of the situation. If the regime had not taken such severe repressive measures, its existence would have been seriously threatened. The Rafsanjani regime cannot fight back a popular uprising with a few technocrats, capitalists and royalists, who have recently returned to Iran - it needs the criminals of Hezbollah. Amidst all the problems, the brief reconciliation between the two factions was a necessary tactical measure which will not jeopardise the general situation and the policy of rapprochement with the West.
Thirdly, the uprising of the urban poor was against the entire system (irrespective of faction). The popular struggle on such a scale, and only a few weeks after the elections of the Majles (which according to the government attracted just fifty percent of the population), shows the lack of confidence in the present regime and makes a mockery of the government's claims of popular support. The recent protests, so soon after the oil workers' strike, herald the start of a new stage in the struggles of the Iranian workers and toilers against the capitalist regime.
The brief success of the uprising in Mashad proves the importance of organising and forming workers' and toilers organisations. The experience of the recent riots demonstrates the necessity of forming clandestine local committees, together with their coordination and expansion, in preparation for the forthcoming mass struggles to overthrow the capitalist regime in Iran.
M. Razi
7 August 1992 (Translation of the Editorial of WSN No 11).
Workers Socialist Notebooks is a journal of Iranian Revolutionary Socialists, which deals with current, historical and political issues facing the vanguard of the Iranian working class. WSN is a bi-monthly journal which appears in Farsi.